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Abstract
This paper evaluates the e¢ cacy of the sterilized foreign exchange rate intervention
while mitigating the pervasive endogenous bias in the intervention literature. In an
attempt to solve the endogeneity problems, this paper utilizes customer trade data
to identify the system of equations. By estimating the various model specications,
including the Markov-switching policy function, the results show that the interventions
undertaken by the Bank of Korea were e¤ective during 2001 and 2002. Specically, the
volatile market induced the Bank of Korea to intervene, and the interventions decreased
the standard deviation of the changes in the Korean won rate from 5.683~5.793 to 5.676.
Keywords: Sterilized intervention; Endogeneity; Customer trade; Markov-switching
policy function
JEL classication: F31; E58; G15
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1 Introduction
The e¤ectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions has been one of the most inten-
sively discussed topics in central bank policy analysis. After reviewing the extensive research
on this topic, one could take a skeptical viewpoint and state that the sterilized interventions
do not meaningfully impact the nominal exchange rate (Craig and Humpage, 2001). At
best, the results are mixed.1 However, due to the endogeneity problems within the previous
research on the topic, the debate on the subject cannot yet be concluded. The objective of
this paper is to assess the e¤ect of the interventions while minimizing the endogeneity bias
by which the existing intervention literatures are plagued. Specically, this paper identies
a system of equations with valid and unique instrumental variables (IVs) from the market
microstructure nance data.
The rst endogeneity problem stems from the simultaneity between the intervention
decision and the contemporaneous exchange rate. This problem occurs because while the
intervention may have an impact on the current spot rate, the current spot rate movement
may also trigger an intervention. If we regress the rate movements on interventions with a
single equation, such as
St = 0 + 1INTt + 2Xt + "t (1)
where St is the di¤erence in the exchange rate, INTt is the central bank intervention and
Xt includes the vector of the other explanatory variables, then the well-known simultaneity
between St and INTt implies that INTt is endogenous. Thus, we will have an inconsistent
estimator for 1 (Neely, 2005; Kearns and Rigobon, 2005).
Endogeneity also occurs due to the omitted variables in equation (1). For the sake of
argument, assume that the interventions are decided regardless of the current spot rate.
Although INTt is exogenous in this case, it is still debatable whether Xt catches all of the
other factors that are to be controlled. If Xt fails to include the variables which have an
1See the literature review of Galati et al. (2005)
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explanatory power on St, 1 will be inconsistent. Of course, most empirical research con-
tains the omitted variable problem. However, it is particularly di¢ cult to nd a valid Xt to
be used for the daily nominal exchange rate models. Existing papers have included the news
and/or day of the week dummy variables, as well as macroeconomic variables, such as the
interest rate spread, as explanatory variables Xt2. However, in many cases the coe¢ cients
are not statistically signicant. Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) showed that macroeconomic mod-
els underperform on simple random walk models in monthly out-of-sample predictions. In
addition, I focus on the daily horizon, for which the macroeconomic variables are likely to
be less relevant than on the longer horizons in regard to the exchange rate determination.
In order to avoid the endogeneity problems from the simultaneity, researchers need to
take into account an intervention policy reaction function, such as
INTt = 0 + 1St +2Yt + ut (2)
where Yt includes factors that explain intervention decisions (Neely, 2005). In order to
estimate these equations, valid instrumental variables must be available. However, similar
to the di¢ culties in nding a relevant Xt, a lack of valid IVs can be problematic.3 In this
paper, customer trade data from the market microstructure nance are used as IVs and the
empirical results verify that these IVs are valid. In addition, customer trades data are shown
to be closely related to the spot rate movements and, thus, the data are used in order to
resolve the omitted variable bias.
In order to illustrate that the endogeneity bias may mislead researchers when assessing
2Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) used the macroeconomic news announcement dummy variables and
the surprise component of the announced variables; Dominguez (1993, 1998) used the interest rate spread
and day dummy variables; Galati et al. (2005) used macroeconomic announcements; Ito (2002) used only
US interventions; Rogers and Siklos (2003) used macroeconomic variables, such as changes in stock market
prices, interest rate spreads and relevant news dummy variables. Bonser-Near and Tanner (1996) and Rogers
and Siklos (2003) regressed the implied volatility on the explanatory variables.
3Kearns and Rigobon (2005) identied a system with the intervention regime change of the Reserve Bank
of Australia and the Bank of Japan using a simulation method. Hillebrand et al. (2007) estimated a system
with the returns of the yen rate, realized volatility and the interventions.
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the e¤ect of interventions, a simple GARCH(1,1) specication was estimated for the market
condition (1) in Korea. This specication showed that the USD buying intervention appre-
ciated the Korean won, and that the interventions increased the volatility of the won rate
in the GARCH model. However, within six di¤erent specications, which will be discussed
below, the results were reversed when the systems of equations were estimated. Speci-
cally, the standard deviation of the changes in the won decreased from 5.683~5.793 to 5.676
with the interventions in the sample period, and the 100 million dollar buying intervention
depreciated the Korean won by 0.006%~0.132%.
The estimation strategy used within this paper is as follows. First, a simple linear
specication with equations (1) and (2) was used. Then, market condition (1) was divided
into demand and supply curves. As the linear systems of the equations were estimated, the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) was attempted. Next, in regard to the nonlinear
specication, the Markov-switching type policy reaction function was estimated with the
Maximum Likelihood Estimation method. Then, the market demand/supply curves were
estimated by the GMM. After estimating the coe¢ cients, the hypothetical exchange rate
was calculated in order to show what the rate would be if no interventions were to exist.
Finally, the standard deviations in the hypothetical rate were compared to those within the
actual rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part Two describes the Korean
foreign exchange market and the data set used within this paper. Part Three illustrates the
model set-up which species the interactions between the interventions, market participants
behaviors and the exchange rate. Part Four explains the empirical results of the study and
Part Five concludes the ndings and the paper.
3
2 Facts and Data
This paper utilizes daily data from 2001 to 2002. During this sample period, the Bank
of Korea allowed the Korean won to uctuate freely according to demand and supply
conditions in the foreign exchange market(The Bank of Korea, 2002, page 46). However,
the Bank of Korea intervened to avoid abrupt uctuations of the exchange rate within a
short-term period(The Bank of Korea, 2003, page 46). In addition, the objective [was] to
mitigate short-term exchange rate volatility, . . . rather than to maintain a certain exchange
rate target(Rhee and Lee, 2005, page197), most of the intervention transactions occurred
within the spot market and the impact of these transactions on the money supply was
sterilized (Rhee and Lee, 2005). Due to the above reasoning, this paper focuses on the e¤ects
of the sterilized interventions on the foreign exchange rate volatility in the Korean won spot
market. For the intervention data, I used the daily change in the foreign exchange position
of the Bank of Korea as a proxy variable, since the Bank of Korea kept the intervention data
condential.
The Korean won spot is not internationalized and, therefore, is only traded within the
Korean foreign exchange market. Specically, the Korean won spot rate is determined by the
Korean interbank (or interdealer) market, which is organized as a limit order book market.
That is, the market participants(or dealers) limit orders to buy (or sell) at certain prices
are matched electronically without a market maker. The market participants are mainly
commercial banks chartered by the government and, thus, other entities who wish to trade
the Korean won spot do so with the participant banks. I refer to these other entities as
customers.
The customers include a wide range of entities, such as enterprises selling the USD
(export companies) or buying the Korean won (import companies); individuals exchanging
the Korean won for the USD at a banks window; foreign investors who need to trade
the USD/KRW spot in order to nance their investments in Korean securities; and other
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trading desks of the banks such as the non-deliverable forwards (NDF) desks whose positions
are frequently hedged by spot transactions. The data for the daily demand and supply
trades from the customers were accumulated by surveying the participant banks. The basic
descriptive statistics for the customer trades are provided in Table 1. While the daily average
of total turnover in the interbank market amounts to 2.6 billion dollars, the customer demand
trades amount to 836 million dollars and the customer supply trades amount to 862 million
dollars on daily average. On average, the price of the US dollar falls (the mean of St is
 0:141), and this feature is consistent with the higher selling pressure from the customers.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3 The Model
Lyons (1997) proposed a market microstructure model for the foreign exchange markets in
which the foreign exchange rate is determined by public information on the rate, such as
interest rate di¤erentials and the order ow. The order ow in the foreign exchange market
refers to "the net of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders" (Evans and Lyons, 2002, page
171). In the empirical ndings of Evans and Lyons (2002), the order ow was estimated to
be highly signicant in determining the foreign exchange rate return.
In Lyons (1997) simultaneous trading model, the order ow is a determinant of the
rate because the order ow conveys the private information which is relevant to the rate
movement. The private information of each dealer is the customer trade. Therefore, customer
trade is the main exogenous determinant factor that a¤ects the rate in Lyonsmodel. This
paper follows Lyonsapproach to the foreign exchange rate in the sense that customer trade
is the main driving force in the foreign exchange market.
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3.1 The Behavior of Market Participants
Assume that the interbank foreign exchange market consists of two representative decision-
making agents: a demander and a supplier. Based on their information sets (
D(S)t denotes
the information set for the demander(supplier) at day t), the demander(supplier) forms a
demand(supply) curve. Lets suppose that the demander receives CDt (customer demand
for the USD) and the supplier receives CSt (customer supply for the USD) at day t. This
supposition means that CDt 2 
Dt; CSt 2 
St.
With the agentsspeculative views, the agents maximize the expected utility from wealth
as dened as:
WDt  (St+1  St)QspecDt ; (3)
WSt  (St  St+1)QspecSt ; (4)
where WDt(WSt) is the wealth of the demander(supplier), Q
spec
Dt (Q
spec
St ) is the quantity de-
manded(supplied) from the speculative incentives, St is St   St 1, and St is the spot rate
of the Korean won against the USD at the end of day t.4 For tractability, the model assumes
that the expected utility function of the agents is a negative exponential with the constant
absolute risk averse coe¢ cients, D (for the demander) and S (for the supplier). Addition-
ally, for a simple closed form objective function of the maximization problem, the model
assumes that St+1 follows the normal distribution conditional on the agentsinformation
set. In order to show this normality, it becomes necessary to partition the time interval from
t to t+1 into N sub-intervals, t = k0 < k1 < k3 < ::: < kN = t+1, i.e. the time index t is for
the day-by-day index and k is for the tick-by-tick index. Therefore, if the rate di¤erentials
for a small fraction of time during day t + 1 are independent and identically distributed
conditional on the information at day t, as given by the Central Limit Theorem, then we
4This denition of wealth is implicit in assuming that the demander and the supplier know that they will
switch roles in near future and, thus, trade with each other at St on day t.
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have,
NX
n=1
Skn j 
Dt = St+1 j 
Dt  N(Dt; 2Dt); (5)
NX
n=1
Skn j 
St = St+1 j 
St  N(St; 2St); (6)
where D(S)t = E[St+1 j 
D(S)t], 2D(S)t = V ar[St+1 j 
D(S)t]. These assumptions generate
the maximization problems for the demander and supplier as follows:
max
QDt
fE[WDt j 
Dt]  D
2
V ar[WDt j 
Dt]g; (7)
max
QSt
fE[WSt j 
St]  S
2
V ar[WSt j 
St]g. (8)
From the rst order conditions, we have the optimal quantity to trade of the demander and
the supplier from the speculative incentives as follows:
QspecDt =
Dt  St
D
2
Dt
; (9)
QspecSt =
 St +St
S
2
St
. (10)
Other than the speculative incentives, the dealers in the foreign exchange market trade
with each other in order to manage their inventory. That is, when a dealer purchases the
USD from a customer (CSt) and the dealers desired position is a zero position, then the
short position of the dealer is an unwanted inventory. In this case, in order to return to the
desired zero position, the dealer should buy the USD. Considering this inventory management
trading, the total amount of desired trading quantity of the agents is as follows:
QDt = CDt +
Dt  St
D
2
Dt
; (11)
QSt = CSt +
 St +St
S
2
St
. (12)
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where QD(S)t is the total quantity demanded(supplied).
The expected values and variances of the future exchange rate di¤erentials, which are
conditional to the participantsinformation, can be modeled. For tractability, the model as-
sumes that the conditional variances are xed. In the next section, a few linear specications
for the conditional expectations will be suggested.
3.2 Empirical Model Specication
This section describes the three suggestions for the empirical model specications. The
rst specication proposes a linear system that contains the market condition and policy
reaction function. The second specication divides the market condition into the linear
demand and supply curves. Finally, in the third suggestion, the policy reaction function
becomes nonlinear with the Markov-switching intervention probability.
The crucial issue when estimating a system of equations is the availability of valid in-
strumental variables. Thus, the identication assumption used within this model will, rst,
be explained and, then, in subsequent sections, tested. One of the issues in this paper is
the inclusion of the Japanese yen exchange rate as an exogenous variable. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the Korean won was synchronized with the Japanese yen for the sample period and,
thus, the yen rate will be a stronginstrumental variable. However, the exogeneity may be
questioned as there might be other unknown factors that inuenced both rates. Therefore,
this paper will contain a variation of each model to be tested with the Japanese yen rate.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3.2.1 Linear Specication (1)
In linear specication (1), the change in the exchange rate is modeled as a linear combination
of the current and lagged customer trades and the current interventions. That is, equations
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(11) and (12) are simultaneously solved by equating QDt to QSt, and the conditional ex-
pectations are assumed to be linear combinations of current and past customer trades and
the interventions. Then, the current intervention is modeled as a linear combination of the
lagged interventions and the current change in the exchange rate. The negative coe¢ cient
for St in policy equation (14) means that the central bank leans against the wind because
the positive INTt refers to the USD buying intervention. This model can be found as follows,
St = m0 +
3X
k=0
m1kCDt k +
3X
k=0
m2kCSt k + m3INTt + "mt; (Market) (13)
INTt = 0 +
3X
k=1
kINTt k + 4St + "pt; (Policy) (14)
where the " terms denote the serially uncorrelated error terms. In this specication, the
lagged interventions are used as excluded instrumental variables in market condition (13)
and customer trades are excluded in the policy function in order to identify St in (14).
In addition, the yen variation model includes the di¤erence in the yen rate in the market
condition, but not in the policy function.
3.2.2 Linear Specication (2)
Next, I will introduce demand and supply. With the division of the market condition, this
model contains a four equation system as follows,
QDt = d0 +
3X
k=1
d1kQt k +
3X
k=0
d2kCDt k + d3St + d4INTt + "dt; (Demand)(15)
QSt = s0 +
3X
k=1
s1kQt k +
3X
k=0
s2kCSt k + s3St + s4INTt + "st; (Supply) (16)
QDt = QSt; (17)
INTt = 0 +
3X
k=1
kINTt k + 4St + "pt: (Policy) (18)
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where Qt is the quantity traded. Equations (15) and (16) are the estimation equations for
(11) and (12), while equation (18) is the linear policy function that illustrates the intervention
decision. The lagged quantity traded is used in order to capture the unknown factors that
inuence the quantity demanded and supplied in an autoregressive manner. In this system,
St and INTt are endogenous variables in the demand and supply curves. When identifying
the demand curve, it is assumed that the customer supply and lagged interventions can be
excluded. Similarly, customer demand is used in order to identify the supply curve. When
identifying the policy function, the customer trades are used as excluded IVs. The variation
of this model occurs due to the inclusion of the di¤erenced yen rate in the demand and
supply curves. This rate is also used as an instrumental variable in the policy function in
the variation model.
3.2.3 Nonlinear Specication
Policy reaction functions are notoriously di¢ cult to estimate due to the complexity of policy
implementations. Thus, the linear specication within this model may be too simplistic. One
of the most notable nonlinear features of the intervention process is the excess zeros in the
series. That is, when the desired intervention is small, the central banks may not intervene at
all, instead of frequently intervening in small amounts. Therefore, the intervention behavior
is modeled in the nonlinear specication as follows,
INTt = dt(0 +
3X
k=1
kINTt k + 4~St + "pt), "pt~N(0; 2) (19)
where dt = 1 occurs when the central bank decides to intervene, dt = 0 occurs when the
central bank does not intervene and ~St is the central banks projected rate change on the
current date.
At this point, the projected rate must be further explained. When the central bank
decides to intervene on day t, it is realistic to assume that the bank cannot exactly know
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St, as the closing rate for day t has not yet been decided. Instead, the bank will attempt
to guess the St, and the intervention decision will, therefore, be based on this guess. In
this paper, this guess is assumed to be a linear projection of St on the customer trades.
In the variation model with the yen rate, St is projected on the customer trades and the
changes in the yen rate.
In order to model the binary choice dt, assume a Markov-switching probability as follows,
pt  Pr(dt = 1 j dt 1 = 0) = exp(0 + 1(j
~St   Strendt j))
1 + exp(0 + 1(j ~St   Strendt j))
; (20)
qt  Pr(dt = 1 j dt 1 = 1) = exp(2 + 3(j
~St   Strendt j))
1 + exp(2 + 3(j ~St   Strendt j))
; (21)
where pt is the probability of switching from the no intervention regimeto the intervention
regime,qt is the probability of remaining in the intervention regime,and Strendt is a moving
average trend of the exchange rate. That is, according to this reaction function, it is more
probable that the central bank will intervene when the projected rate deviates from the
moving average trend, and that the magnitude of the intervention will depend upon the
lagged interventions and ~St.
Then, the likelihood function to be maximized is,
f(;  j fINTtgTt=1) =
TY
t=4
(0 +
3X
k=1
kINTt k + 4~St) f(ptIfdt 1=0g + qtIfdt 1=1g)Ifdt=1g
+((1  pt)Ifdt 1=0g + (1  qt)Ifdt 1=1g)Ifdt=0gg (22)
where () is a standard normal probability density function and Ifg is an indicator function.
As the policy function does not depend on St, the model estimates the demand and
supply curves separately from the policy function. Specically, after estimating the nonlinear
policy function and generating the predicted value [INTt from equation (19), the predicted
intervention values are used in equations (23) and (24) as the generated regressors CDt and
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CSt . The demand and supply functions are as follows,
QDt = d0 +
3X
k=1
d1kQt k +
3X
k=0
d2kCD

t k + d3St + "dt (Demand) (23)
QSt = s0 +
3X
k=1
s1kQt k +
3X
k=0
s2kCS

t k + s3St + "st (Supply) (24)
where CDt is generated as CDt + [INTt when [INTt > 0; CSt = CSt   [INTt if [INTt < 0.
In this model, the assumption in regard to the agentsinformation sets becomes more re-
alistic. In the linear specications, it was assumed that the agents knew the intervention.
However, as the interventions are generally kept secret, this model assumes that the deman-
der(supplier) only knew the sum of the customer demand(supply) and the net buying(selling)
intervention. Therefore, the interventions in this model are one of the factors in the customer
trades. This assumption means that the only endogenous variable is St, the current and
lagged CSt can be used to identify the demand function and CD

t k can be used to identify
the supply function. In addition, the yen rate variation incorporates the changes in the yen
rate in both equations.
4 Results
4.1 Estimation of Coe¢ cients and Identication Tests
The simple descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table 1. According to the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, none of the variables were shown to have a unit root. Before
proceeding to the estimation of the suggested models, I estimated a simple GARCH(1,1)
model for the market condition in order to illustrate the potential endogeneity problems.
In the conditional mean equation, St was regressed on the current customer trades, the
changes in the Japanese yen rate and the interventions. Following Dominguez(1998) exam-
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ple, the day of the week and the holiday dummy variables were included. The conditional
variance equation has the absolute value of the intervention and Table 2 shows that the inter-
ventions are positively correlated to the conditional variances, and the coe¢ cient is strongly
signicant. These results may show that the intervention increases the volatility of the rate
in the sample period. However, these results may not be maintained after controlling for the
endogeneity in the intervention.
[Insert Table 2 here]
First, the linear specications (1) and (2) were estimated using the GMM. In order to
detect the weakness of the instrumental variables, partial F statistics and Cragg-Donald
minimum eigenvalue statistics were calculated (Stock and Yogo, 2002). For the exogeneity
of the IVs, Hansens J statistic was calculated. Then, for the estimation of the nonlinear
specications, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) was implemented for the nonlin-
ear policy function. The GMM estimation with generated regressors was implemented for the
demand and the supply curves. In order to produce the predicted value of the intervention,
a threshold of 0:5 for pt and qt was used in calculating d^t.
Tables 3 through 5 summarize the estimation results. According to the test statistics,
in most cases, the IVs were strong and exogenous. The test statistics for rejecting the null
hypothesis that IVs were weak were always signicant under the 1% level. The inclusion
of the Japanese yen into the model deteriorated the exogeneity of the IVs for St, but
strengthened the IVs relevance. However, even with the yen rate, the null hypothesis that
IVs were exogenous was still, in most cases, acceptable at the 5% signicance level. The only
case in which the null hypothesis was not accepted was the supply curve in a nonlinear spec-
ication without the Japanese yen. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the identication
assumptions within these specications were valid and robust.
The signs of the coe¢ cients corresponded to the intuition, and were strongly signicant.
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First, the coe¢ cient for the intervention in the market condition was found to be signicantly
positive in linear specication (1). (m3 was 0:0164 in the specication without the yen and
0:0104 in the specication with the yen.) As the intervention variable is the net USD buying
intervention, the above result conrms the intuition that when the central bank buys the
USD, its price will increase (the Korean won depreciation). However, in the GARCH(1,1)
estimation, the USD buying intervention was shown to signicantly decrease St. (The
coe¢ cient was 0:1417.) Due to the potential endogeneity bias, the sign of the key parameter
was estimated to be reversed in the GARCH model.
Additionally, when the market condition was divided into the demand and supply curves
in linear specication (2), the interventions were shown to decrease both the demand and
supply quantities. However, the coe¢ cients of the interventions in the demand curves were
insignicant, but were signicant in the supply curves.
Second, the demand(supply) curves were estimated to be downward(upward) sloping.
In addition, when the price of the USD, as denominated by the Japanese yen, increased,
the expected USD price, as denominated by the Korean won (i.e. E[St+1 j 
D(S)t]), also
increased in both equations. The customer demand(supply) trades have positive relationships
with the quantity demanded(supplied) in the same day, but the e¤ects were reversed in the
consecutive days. In regard to the policy functions, St and ~St were negatively related to
the net buying intervention, which means that the central bank sold the USD when its price
(or, guessed price) increased.
[Insert Table 3, 4, 5 here]
4.2 The Hypothetical Rate and the E¤ect of the Interventions
What would have happened in the foreign exchange market if no interventions existed?
This paper tackles this question by calculating the hypothetical rate and comparing it
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to the actual rate. The hypothetical rate is the rate which assumes that there are no
interventions. The rate was calculated by subtracting the intervention terms and, then,
solving the estimated equations for St. The hypothetical rate is the accumulation of the
impulse responses to the shocks in the interventions.
As it is assumed that the Bank of Korea tried to minimize the abrupt changes in the rate,
the sample standard deviation of St becomes a criterion for assessing the e¢ cacy of the
intervention operations. Table 6 summarizes the nal results. Interestingly, the hypothetical
rate argument can be used to identify the causal relationship between the volatile market
and the interventions. That is, in the hypothetical world, the sample standard deviations
were higher in the days with interventions than in the days without interventions. This
result means that the Bank of Korea intervened because the market was volatile.
On the other hand, the standard deviations of the hypothetical rate were always higher
than those of the actual rate. Specically, the standard deviation of St was calculated to
be 5:676 for the whole sample in the actual rate, and the standard deviation was always
higher than 5:676 in the hypothetical rate in every specication ranging from 5:683 to 5:793.
This result shows that the volatility decreased with the interventions. Therefore, the high
volatility ignited the interventions and the interventions decreased the volatility. As the high
volatility and interventions occur simultaneously, the interventions may appear to increase
the volatility as in the example of the GARCH(1,1) model. However, this paper has shown
that the causality may be opposite once the simultaneity bias is controlled.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In addition, the intervention elasticity of the exchange rate was calculated. That is, the
percent change in the rate induced by the 100 million dollar intervention was calculated and
the average of the elasticity is summarized in Table 7. The average varied from 0.006% (the
nonlinear specication with the yen) to 0.132% (linear specication (1)). The Kearns and
15
Rigobon (2005) study shows that the result is 0.2% for the Japanese yen rate. Although the
variability is quite large, a caveat should be given to the interpretation of the elasticity in
the nonlinear specication. That is, the elasticity was calculated only for the days with the
interventions and, thus, cannot capture the dynamics of the e¤ects in total. As the lagged
intervention a¤ects the rate in the nonlinear model, the elasticity may not be a proper
measure. However, it is still apparent that the e¤ectiveness was smaller within the more
complicated and realistic models. For example, the di¤erence in the standard deviation
between the hypothetical rate and the actual rate was largest in linear specication (1) and
smallest in the nonlinear model. This result suggests that the e¤ectiveness of the foreign
exchange rate intervention could be overestimated in the simpler models.
[Insert Table 7 here]
5 Conclusion
Endogeneity problems impede the analysis of the e¤ectiveness of the interventions. In most
studies, the researchers had to estimate only a reduced form equation in which the endoge-
nous variables were used as regressors and the regressors were insignicant. Therefore, the
results of their analyses were obscure. The main motivation of this paper was to clarify the
causality between interventions and the exchange rate volatility. For this task, systems of
equations were specied and estimated with a unique data set that included the customer
trade data. Specically, market participants were modeled to solve the utility maximiza-
tion problems, and the central bank was modeled to intervene to a¤ect the exchange rate.
However, the central bank also reacted to the exchange rate movements. To consistently
estimate the equations, valid IVs were necessary. In order to fulll this requirement, I used
customer trade as the IVs.
This paper reports three main results. First, the models, which are based on the obser-
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vational relationship between volatility and the interventions, may mislead researchers when
assessing the causal relationship between volatility and the interventions. For example, the
GARCH(1,1) specication showed that the interventions were positively related to market
volatility with the same data set. However, this result should not be interpreted to mean
that the interventions caused the high volatility because, within the various specications
controlling the endogeneity, it was shown that the high volatility ignited the intervention,
and that the intervention indeed decreased the volatility. In addition, the e¤ectiveness was
numerically measured as 0.006%~0.132% of the depreciation according to the 100 million
dollar purchases in the sample period in Korea.
The second nding showed that customer trades can be used as valid IVs, and have
explanatory powers in regard to the change in the exchange rate. Throughout the specica-
tions, the customer trades were exogenous and valid IVs, and the results were very robust.
Also, customer trades were signicant in most of the cases in determining the quantity de-
manded, quantity supplied and the exchange rate di¤erential. The nal result shows that
the numerical e¤ect of the intervention decreased with the complication of the model spec-
ications. Therefore, a more careful interpretation of the e¤ect of the interventions should
be undertaken numerically with a simple set-up.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Craig Holden, Eric Leeper, Pravin Trivedi, Konstantin Tyurin, the
seminar participants at Indiana University and the 2008 North American Winter Meeting of
the Econometric Society for their helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors
are mine.
17
References
Bonser-Neal, C., Tanner, G., 1996. Central bank intervention and the volatility of foreign
exchange rates: evidence from the options market. Journal of International Money and
Finance 15 (6), 853-878.
Craig, B., Humpage, O., 2001. Sterilized intervention, nonsterilized intervention, and mon-
etary policy. Working Paper 01-10. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Dominguez, K.M., 1998. Central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility. Journal of
International Money and Finance 17 (1), 161-190.
Dominguez, K.M., 1993. Does central bank intervention increase the volatility of foreign
exchange rates? Working Paper 4532. NBER.
Evans, M.D.D., Lyons, R.K., 2002. Order ow and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of
Political Economy 110 (1), 170-180
Galati, G., Melick, W., Micu, M., 2005. Foreign exchange market intervention and expec-
tations: The yen/dollar exchange rate. Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (6),
982-1011.
Hillebrand, E., Schnabl, G., Ulu, Y., 2007. Japanese foreign exchange intervention and the
yen-to-dollar exchange rate: A simultaneous equations approach using realized volatility.
Unpublished Working Paper. Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA.
Ito, T., 2002. Is foreign exchange intervention e¤ective? The Japanese experiences in the
1990s. Working Paper 8914. NBER.
Kearns, J., Rigobon, R., 2005. Identifying the e¢ cacy of central bank interventions: evidence
from Australia and Japan. Journal of International Economics 66 (1), 31-48.
Lyons, R.K., 1997. A simultaneous trade model of the foreign exchange hot potato. Journal
of International Economics 42 (3-4), 275-298.
Meese, R.A., Rogo¤, K., 1983. Empirical exchange rate models of the seventies, Do they t
out of sample? Journal of International Economics 14 (1), 3-24.
18
Neely, C.J., 2005. An analysis of recent studies of the e¤ect of foreign exchange intervention.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 87 (6), 685-718.
Rhee, G., Lee, E.M., 2005. Foreign exchange intervention and foreign exchange market devel-
opment in Korea. In: Foreign exchange market intervention in emerging markets: motives,
techniques and implications. BIS Papers No. 24. Bank for International Settlements.
Rogers, J.M., Siklos, P.L., 2003. Foreign exchange market intervention in two small open
economics: the Canadian and Australian experience. Journal of International Money and
Finance 22 (3), 393-416.
Stock, J.H., Yogo, M., 2002. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. NBER
Technical Working Paper 284.
The Bank of Korea, 2002. Annual Report 2001, BOK, Seoul.
The Bank of Korea, 2003. Annual Report 2002, BOK, Seoul.
19
Figure 1. The Korean won and the Japanese yen rate in the sample period
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a) source: The Bank of Korea.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables
Q
a)
t St JPYt CD
a)
t CS
a)
t
Mean 2,635 -0.141 0.010 836 862
Standard deviation 561 5.684 0.771 247 237
Skewness 0.230 0.192 -0.148 0.863 0.506
Kurtosis 2.950 4.385 4.096 4.321 3.224
ADF statistics -11.04 -22.44 -22.36 -14.80 -15.51
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
a) Qt (traded quantity), CDt (customer demands) and CSt (customer supply) are expressed
in millions of dollars.
b) St is the daily change in the Korean won rate and JPY t is the daily change in the
Japanese yen rate.
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Table 2. GARCH(1,1) estimation
St = m0 + m1CDt + m2CSt + m3INTt +
4X
k=1
m4kDkt + m5ht + m6JPYt + ut
ut = tt; t  N(0; 1)
2t = 0 + 1u
2
t 1 + 2
2
t 1 + 3ht + 4jINTtj
where Dkt are the day of week dummy variables and ht is a holiday dummy variable.
N = 489; lnL =  1368:043
Wald 2(9) = 411:37; p-value: 0.0000
Coe¢ cient Standard Error z stat. p-value
m0 0.6902 0.8667 0.80 0.426
m1 0.0053 0.0010 5.42 0.000
m2 -0.0057 0.0011 -5.19 0.000
m3 -0.1417 0.0047 -3.00 0.003
m41 0.0792 0.5952 0.13 0.894
m42 -0.9838 0.5776 -1.70 0.089
m43 -0.7441 0.5573 -1.34 0.182
m44 -0.3580 0.5555 -0.64 0.519
m5 1.2709 1.0311 1.23 0.218
m6 3.9454 0.2303 17.13 0.000
0 0.3410 0.3340 1.02 0.307
1 0.0944 0.0238 3.96 0.000
2 0.7966 0.0450 17.70 0.000
3 1.1056 0.5662 1.95 0.051
4 0.0051 0.0007 3.96 0.000
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Table 3. Estimation results for linear specication (1)
Market condition Policy function
without JPY with JPY without JPY with JPY
m0 2.1789 1.5801 0 2.2016 1.6002
(1.3355) (1.0321) (3.0755) (1.1597)
m10(CDt) 0.0097
 0.0072 1(INTt 1) 0.2993 0.2917
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0634) (0.0606)
m11(CDt 1) -0.0024 -0.0021 2(INTt 2) 0.0929 0.0588
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0623) (0.0406)
m12(CDt 2) -0.0002 -0.0003 3(INTt 3) 0.1053 0.0628
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0848) (0.0612)
m13(CDt 3) 0.0009 -0.0005 4(St) -6.2991 -0.7550

(0.0017) (0.0012) (3.5393) (0.3444)
m20(CSt) -0.0096
 -0.0078
(0.0021) (0.0016)
m21(CSt 1) 0.0020 0.0018
(0.0018) (0.0015)
m22(CSt 2) 0.0001 0.0010
(0.0016) (0.0012)
m23(CSt 3) -0.0030 -0.0014
(0.0018) (0.0013)
m3(INTt) 0.0164
 0.0104
(0.0074) (0.0078)
m4(JPYt) 4.5673

(0.2606)
partial R2 b) 0.1745 0.1747 0.0713 0.4457
partial Fb) 13.07 12.97 2.71 40.68
C-Dc) 103.39 103.52 37.55 393.14
Hansens Jd) 0.801(0.670) 0.489(0.783) 1.992(0.960) 14.885(0.061)
a)  denotes signicance at the 1% level.  denotes signicance at the 5% level. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
b) Sheas partial R2 and partial F test statistics
c) Cragg-Donald chi-squared test statistic for identication
d) Hansens J statistic
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Table 4. Estimation results for linear specication (2)
Demand curve Supply curve
without JPY with JPY without JPY with JPY
d0 395.53
 484.79 s0 277.51 246.42
(165.42) (160.94) (150.94) (167.64)
d11(Qt 1) 0.3680
 0.3749 s11(Qt 1) 0.4741
 0.4673
(0.0598) (0.0577) (0.0522) (0.0550)
d12(Qt 2) 0.2193
 0.2414 s12(Qt 2) 0.2124
 0.1994
(0.0606) (0.0580) (0.0563) (0.0592)
d13(Qt 3) 0.2316
 0.1834 s13(Qt 3) 0.1124
 0.1447
(0.0646) (0.0583) (0.0559) (0.0562)
d20(CDt) 0.9721
 0.9292 s20(CSt) 0.9479
 1.0059
(0.1123) (0.1135) (0.1017) (0.1107)
d21(CDt 1) -0.4540
 -0.4844 s21(CSt 1) -0.5134
 -0.5070
(0.0979) (0.0992) (0.1062) (0.1104)
d22(CDt 2) -0.2560
 -0.2357 s22(CSt 2) -0.1447 -0.1915
(0.1161) (0.1166) (0.1097) (0.1133)
d23(CDt 3) -0.1767 -0.1793 s23(CSt 3) 0.0130 -0.0012
(0.1139) (0.1103) (0.1063) (0.1099)
d3(St) -54.180
 -75.416 s3(St) 38.073
 58.229
(16.460) (20.885) (14.512) (21.238)
d4(INTt) -0.4457 -0.3264 s4(INTt) -1.2060
 -1.1467
(0.6031) (0.6544) (0.5580) (0.6765)
d5(JPYt) 368.60
 s5(JPYt) -246.23

(102.37) (100.93)
partial R2(St) 0.0545 0.0593 0.0549 0.0538
partial F(St) 3.65 3.90 3.26 3.08
partial R2(INTt) 0.2199 0.2324 0.2196 0.2301
partial F(INTt) 8.60 8.61 8.67 8.66
C-D 26.81 29.29 27.27 26.82
Hansens J 4.828(0.437) 2.427(0.787) 10.322(0.067) 7.649(0.177)
Policy function
without JPY with JPY without JPY with JPY
0 2.8936 0.8468 3(INTt 3) 0.1046 0.0578
(2.6691) (1.0482) (0.0796) (0.0607)
1(INTt 1) 0.2934 0.3023 4(St) -5.5066 -0.7787
(0.0620) (0.0595) (2.5918) (0.3443)
2(INTt 2) 0.0982 0.0724
(0.0580) (0.0391)
partial R2 0.0836 0.4479 C-D 44.63 396.68
partial F 2.54 30.63 Hansens J 3.016(0.981) 19.486(0.053)
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Table 5. Estimation results for the nonlinear specication
Demand curve Supply curve
without JPY with JPY without JPY with JPY
d0 361.74
 469.57 s0 265.38 237.55
(157.72) (157.42) (160.11) (182.06)
d11(Qt 1) 0.3628
 0.3723 s11(Qt 1) 0.4741
 0.4688
(0.0583) (0.0571) (0.0552) (0.0598)
d12(Qt 2) 0.2280
 0.2460 s12(Qt 2) 0.2250
 0.2031
(0.0572) (0.0568) (0.0593) (0.0634)
d13(Qt 3) 0.2356
 0.1860 s13(Qt 3) 0.1081 0.0510

(0.0624) (0.0577) (0.0588) (0.0608)
d20(CD

t ) 0.9750
 0.9384 s20(CS

t ) 0.9722
 1.0331
(0.1092) (0.1126) (0.1100) (0.1210)
d21(CD

t 1) -0.4532
 -0.4840 s21(CS

t 1) -0.4978
 -0.5153
(0.0955) (0.0998) (0.1130) (0.1223)
d22(CD

t 2) -0.2523
 -0.2418 s22(CS

t 2) -0.1596 -0.1966
(0.1149) (0.1162) (0.1166) (0.1218)
d23(CD

t 3) -0.1713 -0.1794 s23(CS

t 3) -0.0292 -0.0456
(0.1106) (0.1108) (0.1078) (0.1151)
d3(St) -50.200
 -76.272 s3(St) 51.386
 76.818
(15.211) (22.018) (16.283) (24.594)
d4(JPYt) 380.42
 s4(JPYt) -326.25

(107.90) (118.93)
partial R2 0.0647 0.0630 0.0612 0.0549
partial F 5.57 5.32 4.79 4.10
C-D 33.62 32.70 31.70 28.21
Hansens J 5.312(0.150) 2.755(0.431) 8.415(0.038) 5.287(0.152)
Policy function
without JPY with JPY without JPY with JPY
0 1.0479 2.3931  53.192 55.404
(2.4332) (2.5250) (1.7009) (1.7716)
1(INTt 1) 0.3202 0.2835 0 -2.9064
 -3.2270
(0.0430) (0.0443) (0.3205) (0.3400)
2(INTt 2) 0.0958 0.1260 1 0.0484
 0.0658
(0.0440) (0.0456) (0.0170) (0.0164)
3(INTt 3) 0.1785 0.1589 2 -0.8295 -0.9831

(0.0426) (0.0442) (0.4364) (0.4423)
4( ~St) -10.686 -2.1545 3 0.0641
 0.0699
(1.4670) (0.6643) (0.0161) (0.0137)
lnL -2814.2 -2828.3 Wald 2 175.39 123.42
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Table 6. Sample standard deviations of St in the actual and hypothetical rate
Hypothetical rate
Whole sample Intervention day No intervention day
Linear(1) w/o yen 5.793 7.647 5.075
w yen 5.729 7.450 5.075
Linear(2) w/o yen 5.714 7.380 5.086
w yen 5.698 7.352 5.076
Nonlinear w/o yen 5.689 7.298 5.089
w yen 5.683 7.291 5.083
Actual rate
Whole sample Intervention day No intervention day
5.676 7.286 5.075
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Table 7. Estimated intervention elasticity of the exchange rate
Intervention elasticitya)
Linear(1) w/o yen 0.132
w yen 0.083
Linear(2) w/o yen 0.067
w yen 0.051
Nonlinear w/o yen 0.010
w yen 0.006
a) Average % change in St with 100 millions dollar intervention
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